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This paper examines the pre- and post-Brexit experiences and perspectives of migrants from 
three “new” EU countries – Latvia, Poland and Slovakia – who are living and working or 
studying in the London area. Deploying the key-concepts of power-geometry and relational 
space, the analysis explores the way that Brexit impacted the migrants’ connections to the 
UK “bounded space” and their ongoing mobility behaviour and plans. Empirical evidence 
comes from 35 in-depth interviews with migrants, most of whom were interviewed both 
before and after the referendum of 23 June 2016. We find that migrants are unequally 
positioned socio-spatially to deal with the new power-geometries resulting from Brexit, and 
we detect diverging trajectories between the more highly-skilled and high-achieving EU 
citizens and the more disadvantaged low-skilled labour migrants. First, we probe the 
uncertainties brought about by juridical status, related to the length of stay in Britain. Second, 
we explore personal and professional connections and disruptions. Third, we question how 
the power-geometries of time, juridical status and personal/professional 
connections/disruptions shape future mobility plans. 
 
KEYWORDS: power-geometry, relational space, Brexit, London region, migrants from 
“new” EU countries 
 
1. INTRODUCTION  
 
Immediately after the EU Referendum, on the morning of 24 June 2016, speculations, fears 
and uncertainties emerged: who would qualify to remain, who would be “forced” to leave, 
who will want to leave the UK? Brexit poses many questions to population geographers.  But 
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they all are grounded in the chasm between “bounded” and “relational” space; between 
territory defined by borders and regimes of migration control, and space as constructed 
through social relations and fluid, contested boundaries. Furthermore, these judicial, 
migration management-inflicted questions invite us to step back and uncover deeper 
historical relations between the notions of “settled” status versus mobile migrants, between 
“old” and “new” migrants and the politicisation of certain types of newcomers. In an 
infamous quote prior the UK’s general election in 2015, Nigel Farage, then leader of the 
UKIP party and the key figure in stirring anti-immigrant sentiments during the “Leave” 
campaign, moulded colonial and post-socialist migration contexts in the UK’s history of 
making migrants as follows:  
 
I have to confess I do have a slight preference: I do think, naturally, that people from 
India and Australia are in some ways more likely to speak English, understand 
common law and have a connection with this country than some people that come 
perhaps from countries that haven’t fully recovered from being behind the Iron 
Curtain (Mason, 2015).  
 
The people who came to the UK from countries which once were behind the “Iron Curtain” 
are at the heart of our inquiry. Most of our research participants arrived through the free 
movement of labour regime within the EU. However, the Leave campaign built its electoral 
traction through portraying the influx of migrants from the new EU member-states as 
“uncontrollable” and a “threat”. The immediate aftermath of Brexit evoked not only 
uncertainty-related anxiety but also references to the erection of borders, deportations (Stone, 
2017), and a spike in racist and xenophobic incidents (Bulman, 2017). These sensitivities 
were personally unknown to many our interviewees in their pre-Brexit lives in Britain, but 
were still alive in the collective, “haunted” memory of socialist regimes (Etkind, 2009). 
Our focus in this paper is on people themselves and on the geographically unequal 
power relations or “power-geometry” (Massey, 1993), within which they found themselves 
before and after the referendum. Our aim is to unpack the subjectivities that nuance notions 
of “bounded” space and “stable” residence versus “belonging in mobility” and in “relational” 
spaces which are always, as Massey (2005, p. 8) insisted, socially created and “under 





1. How does timing and length of stay in the UK matter in claiming “stable” attachments 
to a place?  
2. How do personal connections and disruptions matter in migrants’ evolving plans to 
remain in the UK or move elsewhere?  
3. And, linking the above two questions together, how do time spent in the UK, personal 
relations, and the sense of originating from the “new” post-socialist member-countries, 
influence migrants’ future trajectories  in the light of the referendum result? 
  
   The paper unfolds as follows. We begin by exploring and theorising the relations 
that our participants have to the UK. Then we provide a concise description of our methods 
and the key characteristics of the research participants. The empirics of the paper consist of 
three sections, in turn presenting research findings related to time, personal connections, and 
migrant trajectories. Finally, we bring our findings together in terms of how relationality and 
power-geometries shape “new” intra-EU mobilities in “Brexiting Britain”.  
 
 
2. THEORISING BETWEEN-NESS:  DISRUPTIONS AND CONNECTIONS 
 
In our ongoing research on new youth mobilities in Europe, young European migrants spoke 
about their sense of rejection, their new-found fear of speaking in accented English, and their 
anger and resignation about rising intolerance towards them before and especially after the 
EU Referendum (Lulle, Moroşanu, & King, 2018). Most of the pre- and post-referendum 
politicised campaigns and media events were “out there” and about “them” – in other words, 
with little recognition of the migrant subjectivities that shape people’s own understanding of 
place and belonging.    
 We unpack the complexity of migrant subjectivities via the theoretical rigour and 
depth of two key concepts of Doreen Massey. The first is “power-geometry” (1993). People 
are unequally positioned, and experience dissimilar effects, due to the ongoing uncertainties 
surrounding Brexit. Such positioning is personal, political and socio-spatial and it crucially 
shapes migrant subjectivities (cf. Conradson and McKay, 2007).  The second is her meta-
concept of relational space (2005). Massey argued against the representation of space just as 
a “surface” of patterns and trajectories. Instead, relational space is filled with histories and 
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ongoing relations, dividing and connecting people in complex ways. As Massey insisted, “if 
you really were to take a slice through time it would be full with holes, of disconnections, of 
tentative half-formed first encounters” (2005, p. 111). The mobile lives of “new” migrants 
from the post-socialist EU countries collided with deeper, half-formed and ongoing 
postcolonial histories. They encountered a changing historical dynamic where, in the early 
postwar years, (Commonwealth) migrants became citizens, whereas from the 1970s on, and 
even more so since Brexit, (European) citizens were turned into immigrants (Bhambra, 2017, 
2018). So, instead of fostering a sense of European belonging, Brexit evoked sentiments of 
separating “us” and “them” (Anderson, 2013), and of diminishing rights to migrants. The new 
divisions were mainly forced upon “them” (migrants), yet in a chaotic and changing manner. 
These included: limitation of rights regarding time spent in the UK, documentation of 
residence and bills paid, and records of travels made outside the UK’s territory, to name just a 
few (Home Office, n.d.). One reactive result was that ad hoc hierarchies were created and 
expressed among EU migrants themselves: some insisted that they are A-rank migrants from 
“old” EU countries, and somehow superior to the “new” and generalised Eastern Europeans 
(Lulle, Moroşanu, & King, 2018). Others draw boundaries within national groups, separating 
“deserving us” from “undeserving them” in terms of class, skills, work-history, law-abidance 
and other factors.  
We use the notion of “boundary drawing” as understood in research into belonging 
and exclusion (Antonsich, 2010). It also proves to be a particularly useful conceptual tool for 
analysing migrant subjective experiences and agency; claims of being at home, belonging to a 
place personally and intimately; and vice-versa, understanding socio-spatial exclusion. 
Moreover, we combine the notion of boundary drawing with Aure’s (2011) take on borders 
that “make migrants” and position them in certain power-geometries. In her study of Russian 
migrants in Norway, a broad spectrum of differentiation comes into play, based on judicial 
status, gender, level of integration, cultural background and work experience. All these 
factors place migrants in unequal positions of control and freedom in their movement across 
borders and their rights in terms of residence permits. When the above-mentioned factors are 
combined differently, certain socio-spatial positions are regarded as inferior, and ranked by 
the local population as “not like us – Norwegians”.  Aure emphasises that employers, and 
especially media campaigners who come up with such inferior rankings, have the power to 
define the position of a migrant in society. However, such definitions do not necessarily 
dictate the day-to-day experiences of migrants themselves. In other words, if some migrants 
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(high-skilled, well-off, integrated etc.) are defined as “deserving” in the Brexit context under 
scrutiny, this does not mean that they themselves internalise the power-geometries imposed 
upon them. Migrants have and exercise agency in multiple ways even under the conditions of 
prolonged political uncertainty caused by the Leave vote and its ongoing chaotic political 
responses. This is precisely why we argue for a deeper and combined understanding of 
migrant subjectivities along with power-geometries. Additionally, we expand Aure’s 
theoretical frame by incorporating the time dimension more strongly into the notions of 
power-geometry and relational space, since time of arrival and the complexity of relations 
within the UK and across borders differ greatly among “new” migrants from the Baltic region 
and Central and Eastern Europe (Burrell, 2010).  
We also need to say some words regarding the notion of “Eastern Europeans”. 
Academic, media, and political discourses in the UK tend to group the countries which joined 
the EU relatively recently under the umbrella of “Eastern Europe” or “Central and Eastern 
Europe” (CEE). Statistics refer to “A8” – Czechia, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, 
Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia, although two other countries – Cyprus and Malta – also 
joined the EU in 2004.1 “A2” refers to Bulgaria and Romania; both joined the EU in 2007. 
A8 and A2 comprise the post-socialist member-countries, which often get equalised with 
Eastern Europe. Indeed, as Paasi (2010) argues, there exists a multitude of actors who – 
intentionally or not – participate in the social construction of a region. The UK opted to open 
its labour market fully to the EU newcomers in 2004 but applied restrictions in 2007 when 
Bulgaria and Romania joined the European bloc; these restrictions expired in 2014. During 
the decade prior to the Brexit vote, an invented region – “Eastern Europe” (Wolff, 1994) – 
and a trope of an archetypal pan-Eastern European migrant were widely diffused by many 
actors in the UK. Other taxonomies, such as the United Nations’ construction of the three 
Baltic republics as Northern European countries, while Poland and Slovakia are categorised 
as Central (and not Eastern) European, have not gained much prominence in UK discourses 
on the regions where migrants come from. And yet, this anti-immigrant sentiment, especially 
against the newly arrived, so-called Eastern Europeans, was easily recognised by our 
participants. Silvey (2004) argues that migrants’ self-conceptions of their possibilities in 
certain places are forged in conjunction with labour market opportunities, including wage 
differences and legal status. These power-geometries give raise to migrant subjectivities and 
also produce specific migration patterns distinguished by different socio-economic realities 
and by contrasting imaginations of what the future holds.  
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Prior research on CEE migrants in the UK has revealed how labour market mobilities 
pull certain groups of these migrants to particular areas (Bauere, Densham, Millar, & Salt, 
2007). CEE migrants have been located in almost all parts of the UK. They exhibit a relative 
concentration in Eastern England and the Midlands, but they are also numerous in absolute 
terms in London and its surrounds, according to data from the Workers Registration Scheme 
and the 2011 Census. However, it was also noticeable that they were pronouncedly more 
concentrated in lower-paid jobs, especially in service sectors, industries and agriculture. CEE 
migrants were exercising their post-2004 mobility rights but simultaneously their trajectories 
were diverging between “achieving” EU citizens and disadvantaged labour migrants 
(Ciupijus, 2011). Many were “living on the move”, thereby posing challenges to social and 
labour market policies that tend to “fix” people to certain places where they could settle, 
integrate and potentially stay for good (Shubin and Dickey, 2013).  
It is interesting that, also in academic discourses, the CEE region has been set apart, 
inferring that the “Western” European countries are more mature, developed and “civilised” 
and that it is the duty of the “old” EU member-states to teach the East-Central European 
countries to become more advanced, democratic and “fully European”. This broadly 
orientalist discourse (Kuus, 2004) spills over into the UK debate on Euroscepticism. In one of 
the first political analyses on Brexit, Clarke, Goodwin, & Whiteley (2017, p. 9) put forward a 
hypothesis that “it had to discern clear positive effects of membership either in the UK or in 
many other EU member states, apart from a handful of former ‘Warsaw Pact’ countries in 
Central and Eastern Europe”. These authors go on suggest that the adverse effects of Brexit 
have been exaggerated by the media, financiers and economists. Of course, as time passes the 
evidence on this becomes more complex as the economic effects fluctuate in contradictory 
ways – continued GDP growth and rising employment, but falling real incomes due to the 
weakening of the pound sterling and emerging labour shortages in key sectors such as 
agriculture and food processing. And there are many other interpretations of Brexit which are 
much more critical, both of the process and the outcome.2 While it is hard to make an 
informed judgement on such speculations, one is clear from our qualitative take on the Brexit 
effects: it did have adverse consequences on European migrants, including our participants – 
those who are usually portrayed as “Eastern Europeans” or coming from the countries behind 
the former “Iron Curtain”.   
After an outline of our methods, we first explore the subjective experiences and 
reflections brought on by varying juridical statuses, including the length and actually existing 
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meanings of residence in the UK for “new” EU migrants. Second, we examine personal 
connections and disruptions. While it might be tempting to attribute changes in ongoing EU 
mobilities, or petitioning for a “settled” status within a newly-bounded UK territorial space, 
to Brexit, most of the participants in our research spoke about personal relationality – break-
ups, new relationships, changes in their employment – as the more important factors that 
made them move, stay, or maintain a mobile life, even if these were combined with the 
uncertainties asociated with Brexit. Third, we question how these preceding issues pertinent 




Our analysis is based on 35 in-depth interviews with relatively recently arrived migrants from 
three Central-Eastern European countries (10 Latvians, 14 Poles and 11 Slovaks) in the wider 
London region, conducted during 2015-2017 as part of the Horizon 2020 YMOBILITY 
project on intra-EU youth mobilities.3 Interviewees were almost equally divided by gender – 
17 men and 18 women; 15 were higher educated, 12 were lower educated, while 8 were 
students. Ages ranged from 22 to 40 at the time of interview but all participants arrived in the 
UK when in their 20s or early 30s. Amongst these 35 research participants, 20 were double 
interviews, carried out both before and after the referendum, when the same respondents were 
re-interviewed. The first-round interviews lasted for about an hour, and covered broad aspects 
of life, work, education experiences, belonging, social inclusion, remittances, travelling 
practices and return migration plans. The repeat interviews focused on experiences after the 
referendum, including changes in migration plans, sense of belonging and emotional 
reactions.  In addition, 15 new interviews, using the first interview schedule and adding the 
post-referendum questions, were carried out in early 2017, in the same region and using the 
same sampling technique. These interviews were added to boost and diversify the overall 
sample. All interviews were carried out in the participants’ native language and 
simultaneously transcribed and translated into English for comparative analysis. Interviews 
were carried out by three authors of this paper who are native speakers of Latvian, Polish and 
Slovak. Interviews and recordings were subject to informed consent, and all participants’ 
names have been changed.  
Research participants resided in London or its metropolitan area, including several 
participants in Brighton. In this part of England, for residents and migrants alike, living 
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expenses and especially accommodation prices are high, which creates a socio-economic 
context for uncertainties related to income and work. Whilst some of the interviewees, those 
who were highly educated and able to capitalise on their specialised qualifications (e.g. 
postgraduate degrees) were successful professionals like their “West” European counterparts, 
others fell into the trap of dequalification or had lower levels of education anyway, and 
constituted part of the lower-skilled workforce in London’s “new ethnic and migrant division 
of labour” (Wills et al., 2010). However, London and Brighton were also areas where there 
was a majority for “Remain” and therefore the participants may have experienced relatively 
more positive attitudes than would have been the case in places with a clear majority of the 
“Leave” vote.   Both formally highly educated and lower educated participants were working 
in diverse occupations ranging from manual, casual work up to managerial positions. 
Amongst the interviewees were cleaners, shop assistants, builders, office workers, railway 
staff and teachers. The data we collected provide rich insights into the diversity of pre- and 
post-referendum experiences and in particular the varied impact of Brexit on those with 
stable jobs and incomes, on the one hand, and those migrants, on the other, who can barely 
make ends meet.  
 
 
4. TIME MATTERS IN POWER-GEOMETRY: RESIDENCE STATUS  
 
Residence status and the possibilities to continue a transnational way of life, travelling back 
and forth between two or more countries, were among the first questions our participants 
asked themselves and each other when the referendum drew very close; and even more so, 
after the vote to Leave. Juridical statuses, including the length and relative permanence of 
residence in the UK, suddenly became a disruptive border between those who could qualify 
to stay and those whose socio-spatial position became uncertain.  
CEE migrants have experienced “migration regime” changes frequently, and some 
remember how new restrictions separated them from other migrants and workers who were in 
the UK for longer. For instance, some of the participants arrived before the A8 countries 
joined the EU in 2004 and they had experienced irregular status. Furthermore, while the 
labour market was fully open for countries where our participants came from, they also had to 
register in the Workers Registration Scheme which existed during 2004–2011 and pay a fee. 
Queues at Dover border control, at airports and embassies are in their personal memory, or 
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are memorialised through collective narratives about pre-EU enlargement. Those who have 
not been in the UK for five years or longer (the threshold for a residence card or “settled 
status”) put their hope in an individualistic, neoliberal ethos; namely, that the “good” and 
“law-abiding” would be allowed to stay. Among our participants, there is a general belief that 
ongoing mobility rights will be less affected for the highly skilled, who work full-time and do 
not live as casual workers “on the move”. In terms of time and timing, although uncertain, the 
post-Brexit power-geometries roughly divided EU migrants as follows: less than five years of 
residence, more than five years of residence, and UK citizens (or dual citizens, as some 
countries, including Latvia and Poland, permit dual citizenship). These three juridical-
temporal divisions are further combined with migrant subjectivities and actual experiences of 
mobilities: the sense of being a “good person” and therefore hoping that restrictive residence 
regulations would not affect him or her personally; hastily applying for a residence permit, 
often co-motivated by fear of repression; along with other factors and subjectivities related to 
time spent in the UK and the psycho-social sense of where a person belongs, regardless of 
juridical statuses. We will illustrate these couplings between power-geometry and 
subjectivities one by one.  
Adriana has a secondary education diploma from Slovakia, and she works as a 
waitress in Brighton. For her, the “Leave” vote was a cause for concern:  
 
I am worried how it would affect me because I have not been here for five years yet. I 
am hoping that it won’t affect me because I’ve been working the whole time I’ve been 
here and I have not been in any trouble. I think it will be the same as before the EU. 
We will need a work permit and stricter and longer controls at the airports and so on. 
 
Note that her worries about her relatively recent arrival are immediately pacified with a 
reflection on herself and what she has been doing in the UK. She was working the whole time 
and this continuous employment provides her with hopeful “proof” that she is a “good 
migrant” (cf. Findlay et al., 2013) in terms of her uninterrupted employment and law-abiding 
manner.  
Agata comes from Poland and arrived in the UK in 2012. She was interviewed in 
2017 when she, purely based on a bureaucratic time-line, could claim five years residence. 
However, she was also travelling back and forth and preparing for her studies in the UK, 




This is the moment which is difficult for us, foreigners, without any…because I don’t 
have any legal document which allows me to stay, I’m here too short time. I’m not 
eligible to obtain a residence card…I was worried that I may have had problems with 
my application to the university, that I’d have to pay higher fees. But so far nothing 
has changed and I hope it will be like that, but I’m aware that it may change in one 
year time…[Brexit] has an impact on me, because I don’t know what will happen, so 
it’s a huge impact I must say. My future here is uncertain. 
 
Krzysztof, a highly-skilled computer programmer, also from Poland, has been living in the 
UK already for 12 years. He rushed to apply for the permanent residence permit immediately 
after the “Leave” vote:  
 
To be honest, I did it [applied for the permanent residence card] straight after the 
referendum outcome. I was frightened that this process can take about six months and 
they needed to keep my passport or ID card for that time, but I was lucky and after 
four weeks they send me both, my passport and the residence card.  
 
The division line between “us” – migrants – and “them” – representatives of the British 
government who decide on juridical status, emerges very clearly in Krzysztof’s account. And 
so does fear, inflicted upon Krzysztof through a complex and unstable atmosphere present in 
the media and the statements of various politicians.  
Yet the division between an atmosphere of fear and the limits of what one can and 
want to do for security of residence can become blurred. Sometimes agency was enacted 
tactically: gathering the resources and making steps towards securing the residence 
documents. Let us consider two further examples. Liene, a casually employed music teacher 
originally from Latvia, has been living in London for six years: 
 
I got the permanent residence permit right after Brexit, so I feel more or less safe. No, 
I am not worried. I technically can apply for the citizenship, but I am thinking now 




Marek, a lower-skilled factory worker from Poland, has been living in the UK for the same 
period of time as Krzysztof, and did the same: submitted an immediate application for the 
residence card. However, he goes further in his plans: 
 
I have a residence card already, but I’ll try to obtain British citizenship, I guess, just 
for peace of mind [laugh] … Brexit prompted me … 
 
Accordingly, obtaining the residence permit in the aftermath of Brexit gave an interim, more 
or less safer feeling.4 However, later on, in mid-2017, a new, “settled” status was announced, 
requiring residence card holders to jump through another hoop (Home Office, 2017). A 
further division thus emerges based on how much one wants and can afford to save for the 
citizenship application, which costs more than £1000.   
These changes in juridical requirements added even more uncertainty, diminishing 
migrants’ spaces of manoeuvre in their respective power-geometries of status and future 
expectations of where they want to legally belong. Such divisions also emerge within families 
where different requirements are in place for adults and for children, creating unequal 
positioning within a family. Consider Michal’s “good will” to stay in the UK as a citizen. He 
is a highly skilled engineer, divorced with two children. He has been living for 14 years in the 
UK. 
 
I’m planning to obtain permanent residence, but I don’t know, is it worth doing now? 
Maybe there will be a new legal status for the foreigners, which will be the 
intermediate step to the citizenship, so it must be declared, because maybe permanent 
residence, which was sufficient to apply for the ‘settled’ status, won’t be enough to 
obtain the British citizenship. It’s gonna be a new status for foreigners, so we need to 
wait for that now, unfortunately. But I will try to obtain citizenship, with pleasure, as 
a way to secure myself […] I’m doing my best to help my children to obtain British 
citizenship. There is a fast-track for them, because they were born in the UK. 
 
He has several tactics in mind and in action, including a mortgage in the UK and plans for his 
children’s judicial status. Accordingly, his agency is enacted as tactical steps, yet taken under 
overarching uncertainty. Not knowing the “value” of the bureaucratic proof of a permanent 
residence status and in which specific form it would be required from EU citizens, he reflects 
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on what he thinks as rationally possible. But once again: migrant agency is constrained 
through political uncertainties and his potential moves are tactical, rather than the strategic 
exertion of agency.  Niklavs from Latvia is in a rather similar situation: divorced and married 
again, he lives in London with his Latvia-born wife and UK-born child. He already tried to 
apply for the citizenship, but: 
 
This sense of helplessness is quite tough. I applied for the citizenship and they asked 
me for the proof that my English language skills are sufficient. I submitted the test I 
did during my first year in London, but I got rejected. They said the test was carried 
out by a testing institution which is not recognised by them [Home Office]. If rejected, 
you can try again, but it all costs, its big money and all requirements are vague. It is 
like a lottery, you do not know if you would be rejected. It feels as if they have some 
indicators to fill; how many of us, in numbers, they have rejected.  
 
In sum: the dividing line between “us” and “them” in migrant subjectivities does not fade 
away with each next step in juridical status and a corresponding move in power-geometry. 
“Us” and “them” subjectivities are further formed within conjectures and uncertainties where 
migrants are in weaker power positions to negotiate their socio-spatial status and mobility 
plans.   
 
5. PERSONAL AND PROFESSIONAL RELATIONS AND DISRUPTIONS 
 
Meanwhile, personal relationships tie and untie individuals to the UK in even more 
complicated and capricious ways than the temporalities of the unfolding “migration regime”. 
This relational space, filled with intimate attachments and break-ups, creates another layer of 
experiences, reflections and judgements which interweave other factors of positionality in 
Britain after the Leave vote. Our data reveal that after personal relationships, e.g. with a 
British citizen, ended, participants stopped having strong emotional ties anchoring them to 
the UK and forged a self-conception of being “free” to live anywhere. However, such 
“freedom” is not equally accessible to all.  Accordingly, in this sub-section we explore 
personal connections and disruptions, longer histories of negotiations among families, and 
consequences of the break-up of personal relationships vis-à-vis ongoing Brexit uncertainties. 
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Furthermore, personal connections to the UK become more complicated through longer-term 
plans of trying to establish a career in the UK.  
We introduced Niklavs and his struggles of applying for the citizenship in the 
previous sub-section. Work was not his primary reason for coming to London; his main 
motivation was to move away from Latvia and a painful experience of divorce: 
 
Why London? It was [long pause]… If I go into personal things, I was married, but 
had a divorce, so I needed to get away. Completely. It coincided with chaotic times. 
I got an unpaid leave so I said that I’ll go away just for a month. I thought that if I 
want, I’ll just go back. And later I understood that I just don’t want to go back. 
Better to go and don’t look back. I stayed in Germany and later I met my future wife. 
This is how I came to London as she had a job here. That’s the story, how I ended up 
in London. I don’t like to look back, I’m always going forward [laughs].  
 
His wife, however, is willing to move back to Latvia, and not only due to Brexit. Their child 
was born in the UK, and since the child is approaching school age, his wife wants to educate 
him in Latvia. Niklavs feels torn between what he wants individually – to get British 
citizenship and stay in the UK – and family considerations. Failure in the citizenship 
application process may dissuade him from certain plans in the UK, yet moving back to 
Latvia is not his desire. This case, therefore, reveals how political ‘disruption’ towards EU 
migrants – the referendum and its aftermath – enters into and partly shapes relational space 
on an intimate, family scale. However, these are never clear-cut relations where only one 
factor plays a decisive role. 
Another angle is illustrated in an extended excerpt from the second interview with 
Gabika, from Slovakia. During the first one, before Brexit, she was envisioning her future in 
the UK. In the second interview the mood changed, but this was not primarily due to Brexit:  
 
 I was still in a long-term relationship with a British citizen up until six months 
before the vote. With the relationship ending, I stopped having emotional ties to the 
UK and became free to live anywhere. I am a freelancer, so there is nothing to 
anchor me to the country in terms of work... I had discussed the referendum mainly 
with my family in Slovakia who were concerned as to what I would do should I have 
to leave the UK, perhaps hoping for me to come back. I never went into long 
14 
 
discussions since I did not feel I wanted to come up with strategies, to worry, to 
make plans before I actually knew what was going to happen. I was surprised that 
my British friends were more shocked and upset than I was [over the referendum 
result]. In a way it felt nice to see so many of my friends upset after the referendum. 
Not so much because of their concern for me, but because of their positive attitude to 
us – people from Eastern Europe. I became more aware, in a positive sense, of my 
Eastern Europeaness and more proud of it too. 
 
Ewelina, originally from Poland, is a teaching assistant at a school in London.  Law-
abiding and meticulous with documents (according to her account), in a new relationship, and 
mother of one child, she is locked into personal relationships and a career trajectory, but is 
also victim of an atmosphere of “blame” against migrants who receive welfare benefits: 
 
The future is uncertain, because I don’t know at this moment what could happen. I 
got benefits, to some extent, despite the fact that I’m working, I’m receiving some 
help, because my salary, even though I’m working full-time, despite my work at 
school, my salary wouldn’t allow me to make a living and pay all the bills. So this is 
my concern, if there still will be benefits for people who stay […] but I believe that it 
won’t be solved in a senseless way and it won’t happen very soon […] I’ve always 
collected payslips, because I think this is required, so I have them.  But I don’t 
panic, I’m not trying to do anything desperately, because there is nothing I can do 
now. I can only comfort myself with the thought that what will happen, will happen. 
[Besides] I’ve always been independent, I was only counting on myself through my 
whole life. But now that situation is also different. At this moment I’m in a different 
position, I’m in a relationship, so my life is dependent on that relation and how it 
will develop. 
 
Such uncertainties are easier to overcome for those who are rather well-off and can 
experiment a bit with life-style and places to live, also thanks to their sought-after skills or 
those of a partner. Monika, a mother of two originally from Poland, is highly educated but 
she has been house-wife for the past five years in the UK. Her long narrative extract below 
recounts her past, current, and possible future mobilities. She is open-minded about the 




I was living for four years in Ireland before, and we decided, my daughter was one 
year old, that maybe we’d return to Poland, that maybe we can find a way to live in 
Poland. It was our last try, I can say, because we were trying to come back a few 
times before. So when we came back from Ireland, we planned to stay in Poland. I 
knew subconsciously that I wouldn’t stand it, but it was a trial. When we decided 
that it’s not for us, that we want a different kind of life, my husband sent his CV to 
Ireland and to England. And everything happened so quickly – I joined him with the 
kids a month later. It wasn’t planned in any way. I wanted to go back to Ireland, 
because I enjoyed living there. 
 
Brighton is very safe place compared to the rest of the country, so it’s good for now. 
But how will it look in few years’ time… For what England allows and their attitude 
towards all these things [referring to Brexit and immigration], it could be really 
hard to live here in few years’ time and really dangerous. So maybe I will try to 
migrate again… I don’t know, to the US? I’m not sure, but New Zealand, Australia 
are the places that I know won’t be a problem to move regarding my husband’s job; 
we will be able to migrate there. 
 
Brexit has not changed the sense of esteem she has for her husband and subsequently, 
their family and life-style. All she says for certain is that the life “back home” in Poland is 
not for her any more. Such experiences and subjectivities have been already documented 
(White, 2014; Monika’s family is certainly not a rare exception). This family clearly leans 
towards English-speaking countries world-wide. In the meantime Monika’s wider reflections 
on deteriorating attitudes towards migrants are less related to fear and more to pitying the 
UK. Her relatively relaxed and detached stance regarding Brexit is clearly related to the skills 
and wealth of the breadwinner, and not their country of origin.   
 
6. “THE FUTURE IS OPEN”, OR NOT? 
 
For the higher qualified, and for students leaving the UK and returning “home” or moving 
elsewhere, future mobility decisions are generally relatively easier. This is particularly so if 
they come from emerging CEE capitals such as Bratislava or Warsaw, and possess 
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qualifications, for instance in information technologies, that open doors in certain sectors of 
the economy. For Peter,  
  
The future is open ... [before Brexit] I didn’t have a deadline [for leaving the UK]. If 
going back home ever becomes a necessity because of my circumstances here, then so 
be it… I am not too worried about my future in Slovakia. Hopefully with my 
education, my experience and my language skills, I will do just fine – if not better than 
here actually.   
 
But here comes a paradox with regard to the Brexit migration discourse (“we want the 
highly-skilled to stay to contribute to the UK economy”) and the subjective power-geometries 
of EU migrants, where the highly-skilled and economically well-off are those who find it 
easier to move, whereas it is generally the lesser-skilled who are keener to stay and secure 
permanent residence. This relationship – that offers of permanent stay are more attractive to 
the lower-skilled – has been proven quantitatively across ten OECD countries (Czaika & 
Parsons, 2017). Thus, policy attempts to “bind” people to a place tend to reduce overall 
human capital stock rather than increase it. 
In the meantime, the future remains highly uncertain despite the wish of many 
participants to ignore uncertainties. McGhee, Moreh, & Vlachantoni (2017) characterise this 
existential dilemma about the interaction between Brexit-related uncertainties and migrants’ 
undetermined plans, or their difficulties in strategising their futures as “undeliberate 
determinacy”. Another way to deal with these uncertainties was to position their mobilities in 
a broader geopolitical context (like Monika, above), or to think beyond themselves as 
individual migrants. Several participants were critically reflective on the significance of the 
label of “Eastern Europe”, not only in the economic terms of migration but also historically 
and morally, as in the words of Gabika (Slovak participant): 
 
 [My national identity] is very important because that’s how I introduce myself – 
that’s where I come from. I guess it also comes with some stereotypes about Eastern 
Europe. But that’s who I feel I am. If I didn’t have that I would be completely lost 
[laugh]. At least… I have a Slovak passport [laugh]… But I feel like I am stuck 
between these two countries and these two cultures. So I am no longer a Slovak, but I 
am not English either. I guess I am trying to say I have two homes… But on the other 
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hand… it’s just different character traits of the two cultures combined in me – but in 
such a way that makes me not fit into either of those cultures completely. […] I have 
published several articles in the Slovak and international media not directly 
associated with  the “Leave” vote, but rather with the broader situation, of which 
Brexit in only one manifestation. These aim to highlight the value of Eastern 
Europeans to international audiences.  
 
There was a noticeable shift in the mood in our repeat interviews. Before the 
referendum there was more openness to future possibilities that could be imagined, 
emphasising a cosmopolitan belonging over the national one. After Brexit, participants 
perceived their nationality as something that cannot be denied or forgotten, and, indeed, in 
moral terms, should be celebrated. This strengthened sense of national origin and resistance 
to the growing negative portrayal of “Eastern Europeans” emerges as an additional dimension 
to what Bhambra (2016) called “the making of migrants instead of citizens” through the 
Brexit event.  While it is too early to predict any deeper spatial impact of Brexit on places 
where “new” EU migrants are more concentrated, the potential loss of EU Structural Funds 
for the UK may add additional economic uncertainties for CEE migrants, and indeed for the 
alienated “native” working classes in these disadvantaged regions, the victims of the 
Conservative government’s politics of austerity, who were one of the main groups voting for 
Brexit (Morgan, 2017). In the meantime, the possible combination of blocked migration to 
Britain and enlarged return flows of CEE migrants may require new employment-related 
regional policies for areas and countries affected by these “reversed” migration trends 
(Bachtler & Begg, 2017, 2018; Di Cataldo, 2017).  
Like the highly skilled, students also tend to emphasise their own choice, denying 
much importance for Brexit in their decision-making on future mobilities. This is illustrated 
first in the words of Martin, a Slovakian student; and second in the quote of aspiring actress 
Paulina, from Poland, who is intent on doing a Master’s degree.  
 
I had already decided to stay in the UK before the Brexit vote happened. As nothing 
can be done yet, I can’t say if it will influence my decision. If I would feel that I need 




If the student loan will be accessible, I could do my Master’s here because without a 
loan I simply cannot do it. Then I will do my Masters somewhere else in the EU, it 
doesn’t matter in which country. Moving to another country could be a great 
experience actually, and I’m leaning to this second option now. 
 
The biggest challenge is for those employed in lower-skilled jobs in the UK. Their 
future possibilities are more constrained, both in the narratives of those who have invested 
much in their lives of the UK, and in the accounts of the less advantaged, who have been out 
of full-time work during some periods of their stay in the UK, or who have only recently 
arrived. The power-geometrics created by Brexit, economic forces, and these migrants’ own 
limitations (poor English, few qualifications, or non-recognition of “foreign” diplomas etc.) 
offer them reduced hope for the future, either in “Brexiting Britain” or in their countries of 
origin. 
Karlis, from Latvia, has a university degree in fine arts and gave his reflections in his 
pre-Brexit interview. His English was rudimentary when he first arrived in London and he 
was aiming for any job at the beginning. He secured a contract in a warehouse but due to 
various problems, he became homeless. For some months he was sleeping rough, using 
public showers and laundrettes, and going to work every day. The main lesson he shares in 
his lively quote below is that, subjectively, “Eastern Europeans” can get used to diminished 
rights and restricted access to social welfare: 
 
I can tell with 99% certainty that for the people who are already in, nothing bad will 
happen. If you are from Eastern Europe, you are used to changes, to the fact that 
you cannot influence [politics in the UK]. If you are here already for a year, you 
may even not know but there have already been changes implemented that affect our 
lives. We cannot ask for benefits like the British and other Europeans can. An 
Eastern European can receive unemployment benefit only for three months. If you 
cannot find a job within three months, you are welcome to leave! But if you live 
here, pay taxes, study, do a job, nobody will throw you out, because they [UK] need 
you! If you are unemployed, on the street, homeless, you will be deported anyway. 
But nobody will deport thousands and millions as it is said in the press. It’s bullshit, 
nonsense. People pay taxes and throwing them out would be the same as putting 
your hand in your pocket, opening your wallet and throwing away your money. It 
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will not happen here. They [British] value money a lot, and they value people who 
make money for them. 
 
The second lesson in Karlis’ account is that the tabloid media might spread fear and threats of 
deportation but the simple economics of migrants’ lucrative presence in the UK will win. His 
narrative is direct and outspoken but also exhibits critical reflexivity (cf. Aure, 2011). Karlis 
does not position himself as a victim of Brexit or of the harsh conditions he went through in 
the UK. Instead, he enacts his agency as an individual who is aware of his migrant 
positioning but who makes sense of politics and utilitarian realities. This economic logic as 
the strongest guard against expulsions from a “bounded” UK space was internalised by many 
of the participants, including Lucia below.    
 
Personally I think that the UK is not going to expel us. After all we work here and 
we meet all our obligations, pay our taxes etc.  For the future, I expect that I would 
have to get a working visa as a Slovak citizen. Brexit would definitely affect my 
plans if I decide to stay in London for longer. If the living conditions change 
significantly after Brexit and it will be no longer worth my while to stay here, I think 
I will seek an alternative country where I would live within the European Union. 
 
Both Karlis and Lucia articulate “tactics of belonging” (working hard, paying taxes, etc.) 
whilst also, in the case of Lucia, venturing to predict what could happen, emphasising her 
possible future “rational choice” decision to move out if the economic situation and/or Brexit 
regulations makes that the logical outcome (Lulle, Moroşanu, & King, 2018). More 
importantly, she emphasises her EU migrant’s agency: if life becomes too difficult, as an EU 
citizen, she is ready to seek alternatives elsewhere within the space of free mobility. 
In sum: the imagined future mobilities of the interviewees are evidently shaped 
through the intersections of migrant subjectivities and preceding and changing power-
geometries: the economically more well-off and high-skilled are less concerned and more 
open to leave the UK, but they give little recognition to the Brexit outcome in these 
imaginations. Conversely, for those who are less advantaged socio-economically, the 
potential impacts of Brexit are more negative and these migrants’ future imaginations are 
tinged with a sense of restricted choices. For all, whether our participants hope to stay in the 
UK or move out, the UK is increasingly more imagined as a “bounded” territory where the 
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“meaning” and “atmosphere” surrounding migration have fundamentally changed – from a 
space of free entry to a possible space of controlled and limited access. 
 
7. CONCLUSION  
 
This paper contributes to recent efforts to understand the impact of the EU Referendum on 
“new” EU migrants, usually portrayed as “Eastern European” migrants. Through 
operationalising Massey’s (1993, 2005) ideas on power-geometries and relational space, our 
analysis explored the complex temporalities and socio-spatialities of migrant trajectories 
which are emerging in the slowly unfolding aftermath of this momentous geopolitical event.  
However, when placed in the broader contexts of EU peripheries, semi-peripheries 
and emerging “growth” regions in the EU on one hand, and mobility restrictions for some and 
“freedoms” for others on the other hand, we see how inequalities continue to be generated in 
space and time, and may shape the future life trajectories of CEE migrants currently residing 
in the UK (Williams, 2009).      
Most of the interviewees were the de facto “Euro-generation” (cf. Favell, 2008) – 
growing up with the reality of peace and democracy in the nearly three decades since the 
demise of the Iron Curtain, and not what Farage attempted to describe as people from 
countries which have not yet internalised “our” (i.e. the UK’s semi-colonial) values. Few of 
our participants had direct political experience of being voiceless in their home countries, and 
“came of age” when totalitarian regimes were already past.  
In terms of timing and power-geometries, in lives and livelihoods which are not yet 
established, the messages from the UK government regarding the requirements for settled 
status, in terms of regular income, stable home and address, presenting evidence for any trips 
outside Great Britain, completely disregard the mobile realities of migrant lives – their 
“mobile being” (Shubin, 2015). According to the interview evidence, the disadvantaged 
situation of those who have lived in the UK for less than five years before the referendum 
date was mitigated by a discursive insistence on being a “good worker” and a law-abiding 
person who pays their taxes. Applications for residence permits were triggered by fear of 
expulsions, whereas applying for citizenship was a process which oscillated between a sense 
of necessity and purely material considerations: the application costs exceed £1000, a real 
obstacle for those in lower-paid jobs.  However, the EU migrants whom we interviewed do 
not live in constant fear; they do have agency, although constrained by Brexit’s continuing 
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uncertainties. They speculate, make judgements and assumptions and reflect on the 
possibilities they have or could create in the future. Importantly, as holders of EU passports, 
they see their space of mobility as wider than the UK or their country of origin; hence they 
talk about moving elsewhere within the EU. 
In this paper we have sought to add nuance to an understanding of what relational 
space means for EU migrants in Brexiting UK. Crucially, such space manifests its existence 
through personal relationships and attachments to the UK. And, conversely, personal break-
ups also impact economic realities and future migration considerations.  In terms of age and 
family status, younger migrants, without children, without a permanent job or a settled home, 
technically can leave the country more easily than older, more established migrants. The 
participants’ personal and professional lives entwine with the political disruption of Brexit in 
complex ways. Some chose the UK not because of job opportunities but because their 
partners either lived or wanted to go there and they simply followed. Moreover, personal 
relationships are dynamic and a break-up with a partner can significantly reshape young 
people’s perspectives of where they belong (or do not have a “stable” or emotionally 
meaningful attachment any more).  Professionally, participants feared that even being a good 
worker who carefully collects pay slips may not be enough in an atmosphere of victimisation 
and blaming. Not just migrant teaching assistants like Ewalina, but likewise many British 
citizens find it hard to make ends meet in London, but the blame vested on benefit-receivers 
has been strongly coupled with a migrant status.  Above all, the participants tend to prioritise 
their personal mobility histories and future plans, and did not allow Brexit-related events to 
dictate what they will actually do.  As Antonsich (2010, pp. 652–653) has argued, belonging 
to a place is above all a personal feeling, but it is conditioned by power relations. Brexit is 
indeed an unprecedented test for transnational connections and disruptions, where several 
nuances emerged: a heightened sense of being “Eastern European” in the UK and in the 
world, and yet an intensified need to reflect upon and be proud of one’s ethnic and regional 
origin in the face of negative portrayals by the Brexit-dominated media. 
When it comes to future mobility trajectories, the clearest division is based on income 
and skills: the higher-skilled were more prone to leave because they can afford to do so. Both 
students and higher-skilled working migrants expressed a desire for more temporary 
migration, some thought to leave for more welcoming countries in Europe, but others stated 
their readiness to adjust to the harsher climate surrounding immigrants in the UK.  
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Finally, and most importantly, our approach to conceptualising and illustrating 
relational space and power-geometries was through prioritising participants’ own voices. 
Through this we demonstrated how power-geometries are coupled and shaped through 
migrant subjectivities and migrants’ unequal positioning in time and space. The political 
struggle launched by Brexit to control the freedom of human mobility constitutes an agenda 
which contradicts the reality and wishes of people in Europe, especially when they are young, 
to lead mobile relational lives. This raises future research issues on the specific 
manifestations of British nationalism and intra-EU mobility “values” and how these will 
unfold in the lives of those who will stay in the UK. Our working response in this paper is as 
follows: by first listening to people and learning about their entangled personal and 
professional lives, understanding their actual experiences, we are better equipped to build a 
future which works not against, but for the people in post-Brexit Britain.  
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